Serene J. Khader
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199777884
- eISBN:
- 9780199919055
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199777884.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Women and other oppressed and deprived people sometimes collude with the forces that perpetuate injustice against them. Women’s acceptance of their lesser claim on household resources like food, ...
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Women and other oppressed and deprived people sometimes collude with the forces that perpetuate injustice against them. Women’s acceptance of their lesser claim on household resources like food, their positive attitudes toward clitoridectemy and infibulation, their acquiescence to violence at the hands of their husbands, and their sometimes fatalistic attitudes toward their own poverty or suffering are all examples of “adaptive preferences,” wherein women participate in their own deprivation. This book offers a definition of adaptive preference and a moral framework for responding to adaptive preferences in development practice. The book defines adaptive preferences as deficits in the capacity to lead a flourishing human life that are causally related to deprivation and argues that public institutions should conduct deliberative interventions to transform the adaptive preferences of deprived people. It insists that people with adaptive preferences can experience value distortion, but it explains how this fact does not undermine those people’s claim to participate in designing development interventions that determine the course of their lives. The book claims that adaptive preference identification requires a commitment to moral universalism, but this commitment need not be incompatible with a respect for culturally variant conceptions of the good. She illustrates her arguments with examples from real-world development practice. Its deliberative perfectionist approach moves us beyond apparent impasses in the debates about internalized oppression and autonomous agency, relativism and universalism, and feminism and multiculturalism.Less
Women and other oppressed and deprived people sometimes collude with the forces that perpetuate injustice against them. Women’s acceptance of their lesser claim on household resources like food, their positive attitudes toward clitoridectemy and infibulation, their acquiescence to violence at the hands of their husbands, and their sometimes fatalistic attitudes toward their own poverty or suffering are all examples of “adaptive preferences,” wherein women participate in their own deprivation. This book offers a definition of adaptive preference and a moral framework for responding to adaptive preferences in development practice. The book defines adaptive preferences as deficits in the capacity to lead a flourishing human life that are causally related to deprivation and argues that public institutions should conduct deliberative interventions to transform the adaptive preferences of deprived people. It insists that people with adaptive preferences can experience value distortion, but it explains how this fact does not undermine those people’s claim to participate in designing development interventions that determine the course of their lives. The book claims that adaptive preference identification requires a commitment to moral universalism, but this commitment need not be incompatible with a respect for culturally variant conceptions of the good. She illustrates her arguments with examples from real-world development practice. Its deliberative perfectionist approach moves us beyond apparent impasses in the debates about internalized oppression and autonomous agency, relativism and universalism, and feminism and multiculturalism.
Clare Chambers
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- August 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198744009
- eISBN:
- 9780191842337
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198744009.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defence of the Marriage-Free State is a critique of the state recognition of marriage and a proposal for an alternative form of regulation. Part One, ‘Against ...
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Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defence of the Marriage-Free State is a critique of the state recognition of marriage and a proposal for an alternative form of regulation. Part One, ‘Against Marriage’, sets out the critique. State-recognized marriage is unjust as it violates two fundamental values: equality and freedom. Marriage has historically been an instrument for maintaining inequality between men and women both practically, through laws, and symbolically, through norms. Marriage also violates equality between same-sex and different-sex couples. Reform can remove some of these inequalities, but marriage inevitably involves inequality between married and unmarried people. Moreover, state-recognized marriage threatens liberty since it involves the state endorsing a particular way of life. Various arguments have been offered in favour of this state promotion, but none of them adequately support the state recognition of marriage as opposed to other, more inclusive measures. Part Two, ‘The Marriage-Free State’, sets out the alternative. Most feminist and egalitarian critics of state-recognized marriage advocate replacing it with either relationship contracts or alternative statuses such as civil or care-based unions. Neither option is ideal, particularly since both contracts and alternative statuses leave vulnerable people unprotected. Instead, the book proposes a piecemeal, practice-based model of regulation, applying to all people who are engaging in relationship practices that should justly be regulated. In this model, equality is secured by the regulations themselves and liberty is secured by opting out. Finally, the book considers how the state should act to ensure equality in private marriages, be they religious or secular.Less
Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defence of the Marriage-Free State is a critique of the state recognition of marriage and a proposal for an alternative form of regulation. Part One, ‘Against Marriage’, sets out the critique. State-recognized marriage is unjust as it violates two fundamental values: equality and freedom. Marriage has historically been an instrument for maintaining inequality between men and women both practically, through laws, and symbolically, through norms. Marriage also violates equality between same-sex and different-sex couples. Reform can remove some of these inequalities, but marriage inevitably involves inequality between married and unmarried people. Moreover, state-recognized marriage threatens liberty since it involves the state endorsing a particular way of life. Various arguments have been offered in favour of this state promotion, but none of them adequately support the state recognition of marriage as opposed to other, more inclusive measures. Part Two, ‘The Marriage-Free State’, sets out the alternative. Most feminist and egalitarian critics of state-recognized marriage advocate replacing it with either relationship contracts or alternative statuses such as civil or care-based unions. Neither option is ideal, particularly since both contracts and alternative statuses leave vulnerable people unprotected. Instead, the book proposes a piecemeal, practice-based model of regulation, applying to all people who are engaging in relationship practices that should justly be regulated. In this model, equality is secured by the regulations themselves and liberty is secured by opting out. Finally, the book considers how the state should act to ensure equality in private marriages, be they religious or secular.
Marilyn Friedman
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138504
- eISBN:
- 9780199785902
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138503.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Women have historically been prevented from living autonomously by systematic injustice, subordination, and oppression. The lingering effects of these practices have prompted many feminists to view ...
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Women have historically been prevented from living autonomously by systematic injustice, subordination, and oppression. The lingering effects of these practices have prompted many feminists to view autonomy with suspicion. This book defends the ideal of feminist autonomy. The book proposes that behavior is autonomous if it accords with the wants, cares, values, or commitments that the actor has reaffirmed and is able to sustain in the face of opposition. By this account, autonomy is socially grounded yet also individualizing and sometimes socially disruptive, qualities that can be ultimately advantageous for women. The book applies the concept of autonomy to domains of special interest to women. It defends the importance of autonomy in romantic love, considers how social institutions should respond to women who choose to remain in abusive relationships, and argues that liberal societies should tolerate minority cultural practices that violate women's rights so long as the women in question have chosen autonomously to live according to those practices.Less
Women have historically been prevented from living autonomously by systematic injustice, subordination, and oppression. The lingering effects of these practices have prompted many feminists to view autonomy with suspicion. This book defends the ideal of feminist autonomy. The book proposes that behavior is autonomous if it accords with the wants, cares, values, or commitments that the actor has reaffirmed and is able to sustain in the face of opposition. By this account, autonomy is socially grounded yet also individualizing and sometimes socially disruptive, qualities that can be ultimately advantageous for women. The book applies the concept of autonomy to domains of special interest to women. It defends the importance of autonomy in romantic love, considers how social institutions should respond to women who choose to remain in abusive relationships, and argues that liberal societies should tolerate minority cultural practices that violate women's rights so long as the women in question have chosen autonomously to live according to those practices.
Andrea Veltman and Mark Piper (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199969104
- eISBN:
- 9780190225711
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199969104.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This collection of new essays examines philosophical issues at the intersection of feminism and autonomy studies. Are autonomy and independence useful goals for women and subordinate persons? Is ...
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This collection of new essays examines philosophical issues at the intersection of feminism and autonomy studies. Are autonomy and independence useful goals for women and subordinate persons? Is autonomy possible in contexts of social subordination and oppression? Is the pursuit of desires that issue from patriarchal norms consistent with autonomous agency? How should we understand the concepts of relational autonomy and adaptive preferences? How do emotions and caring relate to autonomous deliberation? Contributors to this collection answer these and related questions, advancing central debates in autonomy theory by examining basic components, normative commitments, and applications of conceptions of autonomy. Several chapters look at the conditions necessary for autonomous agency and at the role that values and norms—such as independence, equality, inclusivity, self-respect, care, and femininity—play in feminist theories of autonomy. Whereas some contributing authors focus on dimensions of autonomy that are internal to the mind—such as deliberative reflection, desires, cares, emotions, self-identities, and feelings of self-worth—others address social conditions and practices that support or stifle autonomous agency, often answering questions of practical import. For example, what type of gender socialization best supports autonomous agency and feminist goals? When does adapting to severely oppressive circumstances, such as those in human trafficking, turn into a loss of autonomy? How are ideals of autonomy affected by capitalism and by different forms of working life? How do conceptions of autonomy inform issues in bioethics, such as end-of-life decisions or rights to bodily self-determination?Less
This collection of new essays examines philosophical issues at the intersection of feminism and autonomy studies. Are autonomy and independence useful goals for women and subordinate persons? Is autonomy possible in contexts of social subordination and oppression? Is the pursuit of desires that issue from patriarchal norms consistent with autonomous agency? How should we understand the concepts of relational autonomy and adaptive preferences? How do emotions and caring relate to autonomous deliberation? Contributors to this collection answer these and related questions, advancing central debates in autonomy theory by examining basic components, normative commitments, and applications of conceptions of autonomy. Several chapters look at the conditions necessary for autonomous agency and at the role that values and norms—such as independence, equality, inclusivity, self-respect, care, and femininity—play in feminist theories of autonomy. Whereas some contributing authors focus on dimensions of autonomy that are internal to the mind—such as deliberative reflection, desires, cares, emotions, self-identities, and feelings of self-worth—others address social conditions and practices that support or stifle autonomous agency, often answering questions of practical import. For example, what type of gender socialization best supports autonomous agency and feminist goals? When does adapting to severely oppressive circumstances, such as those in human trafficking, turn into a loss of autonomy? How are ideals of autonomy affected by capitalism and by different forms of working life? How do conceptions of autonomy inform issues in bioethics, such as end-of-life decisions or rights to bodily self-determination?
Mari Mikkola (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190257910
- eISBN:
- 9780190257927
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190257910.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, American Philosophy
This collection of eleven previously unpublished chapters contains the latest developments in analytic feminist philosophy on the topic of pornography. A rich feminist literature on pornography has ...
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This collection of eleven previously unpublished chapters contains the latest developments in analytic feminist philosophy on the topic of pornography. A rich feminist literature on pornography has emerged since the 1980s, and Rae Langton’s speech act theoretic analysis has dominated specifically Anglo-American feminist philosophy on pornography. Despite this literature, there are considerable disagreements and precious little agreement on many key issues, such as what pornography is, whether (following Langton) it subordinates and silences women, whether it objectifies women in harmful ways, and whether it is authoritative enough to enact women’s subordination. Given these deep disagreements, the first goal of this book is to take stock of extant debates to clarify some key feminist conceptual and political commitments when discussing pornography. However, in so doing, it aims to go beyond the prevalent speech act approach to pornography. Thus, its second goal is to highlight new issues in feminist pornography debates. The book examines newer lines of inquiry and investigates what they can tell us about still-unsettled conceptual and political questions. In doing so, it opens a space for themes and debates that have to date received surprisingly little attention (such as aesthetics and putatively feminist pornography). The book aims to make progress philosophically analyzing pornography without simply rehashing old debates while still acknowledging the value of earlier feminist work. Thus, the book’s leading idea is to go “beyond speech” but without changing the terms of the debate wholesale.Less
This collection of eleven previously unpublished chapters contains the latest developments in analytic feminist philosophy on the topic of pornography. A rich feminist literature on pornography has emerged since the 1980s, and Rae Langton’s speech act theoretic analysis has dominated specifically Anglo-American feminist philosophy on pornography. Despite this literature, there are considerable disagreements and precious little agreement on many key issues, such as what pornography is, whether (following Langton) it subordinates and silences women, whether it objectifies women in harmful ways, and whether it is authoritative enough to enact women’s subordination. Given these deep disagreements, the first goal of this book is to take stock of extant debates to clarify some key feminist conceptual and political commitments when discussing pornography. However, in so doing, it aims to go beyond the prevalent speech act approach to pornography. Thus, its second goal is to highlight new issues in feminist pornography debates. The book examines newer lines of inquiry and investigates what they can tell us about still-unsettled conceptual and political questions. In doing so, it opens a space for themes and debates that have to date received surprisingly little attention (such as aesthetics and putatively feminist pornography). The book aims to make progress philosophically analyzing pornography without simply rehashing old debates while still acknowledging the value of earlier feminist work. Thus, the book’s leading idea is to go “beyond speech” but without changing the terms of the debate wholesale.
Mary Briody Mahowald
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195176179
- eISBN:
- 9780199786558
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195176170.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This book deals with bioethical issues relevant to women across the life span. “Gender justice” is the starting point and the end point of the author’s approach to the issues addressed. The first ...
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This book deals with bioethical issues relevant to women across the life span. “Gender justice” is the starting point and the end point of the author’s approach to the issues addressed. The first section offers an overview of bioethics, critiques prevalent approaches to bioethics and models of the physician-patient relationship, and sketches distinguishing aspects of women’s health care. Classical pragmatists and feminist standpoint theorists are enlisted in support of “an egalitarian perspective”, and positions on the moral status of fetuses and those already born are examined. The second section identifies topics that are directly or indirectly related to women’s health; these include prenatal testing, childbirth and newborn decisions, treatment of minors and the elderly, assisted reproduction, abortion, eating disorders, domestic violence, breast and gynecological cancer, end of life care, and research on women. Brief cases illustrate variables related to each topic. Empirical and theoretical considerations follow each set of cases; these are intended to precipitate more expansive and critical examination of the questions raised. The book concludes with discussion of an egalitarian ideal to be pursued through an ethic of virtue or supererogation rather than obligation. By embracing this ideal, according to the author, moral agents support a more demanding level of morality than guidelines or laws require.Less
This book deals with bioethical issues relevant to women across the life span. “Gender justice” is the starting point and the end point of the author’s approach to the issues addressed. The first section offers an overview of bioethics, critiques prevalent approaches to bioethics and models of the physician-patient relationship, and sketches distinguishing aspects of women’s health care. Classical pragmatists and feminist standpoint theorists are enlisted in support of “an egalitarian perspective”, and positions on the moral status of fetuses and those already born are examined. The second section identifies topics that are directly or indirectly related to women’s health; these include prenatal testing, childbirth and newborn decisions, treatment of minors and the elderly, assisted reproduction, abortion, eating disorders, domestic violence, breast and gynecological cancer, end of life care, and research on women. Brief cases illustrate variables related to each topic. Empirical and theoretical considerations follow each set of cases; these are intended to precipitate more expansive and critical examination of the questions raised. The book concludes with discussion of an egalitarian ideal to be pursued through an ethic of virtue or supererogation rather than obligation. By embracing this ideal, according to the author, moral agents support a more demanding level of morality than guidelines or laws require.
Sherri Irvin (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198716778
- eISBN:
- 9780191785351
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716778.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Feminist Philosophy
The body is a rich object for aesthetic inquiry. We aesthetically assess our own bodies and those of others, and our felt bodily experiences—as we eat, have sex, and engage in other everyday ...
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The body is a rich object for aesthetic inquiry. We aesthetically assess our own bodies and those of others, and our felt bodily experiences—as we eat, have sex, and engage in other everyday activities—have aesthetic qualities. The body, whether depicted or actively performing, features in aesthetic experiences of visual art, theater, dance and sports. Body aesthetics can be a source of delight for both the subject and the object of the gaze. But aesthetic consideration of bodies also raises acute ethical questions: the body is intertwined with identity and sense of self, and aesthetic assessment of bodies can perpetuate oppression based on race, gender identity, sexual orientation, age, size, and disability. Artistic and media representations shape how we see and engage with bodies, with consequences both personal and political. This volume contains sixteen original essays by contributors in philosophy, sociology, dance, disability theory, critical race studies, feminist theory, medicine, and law. Contributors take on bodily beauty, sexual attractiveness, the role of images in power relations, the aesthetics of disabled bodies, the construction of national identity, the creation of compassion through bodily presence, the role of bodily style in moral comportment, and the somatic aesthetics of racialized police violence.Less
The body is a rich object for aesthetic inquiry. We aesthetically assess our own bodies and those of others, and our felt bodily experiences—as we eat, have sex, and engage in other everyday activities—have aesthetic qualities. The body, whether depicted or actively performing, features in aesthetic experiences of visual art, theater, dance and sports. Body aesthetics can be a source of delight for both the subject and the object of the gaze. But aesthetic consideration of bodies also raises acute ethical questions: the body is intertwined with identity and sense of self, and aesthetic assessment of bodies can perpetuate oppression based on race, gender identity, sexual orientation, age, size, and disability. Artistic and media representations shape how we see and engage with bodies, with consequences both personal and political. This volume contains sixteen original essays by contributors in philosophy, sociology, dance, disability theory, critical race studies, feminist theory, medicine, and law. Contributors take on bodily beauty, sexual attractiveness, the role of images in power relations, the aesthetics of disabled bodies, the construction of national identity, the creation of compassion through bodily presence, the role of bodily style in moral comportment, and the somatic aesthetics of racialized police violence.
Lisa Tessman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195179149
- eISBN:
- 9780199835782
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195179145.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on ...
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Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, the book addresses the ways in which the devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities for flourishing. The book describes two different forms of “moral trouble” prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them, and that are referred to as “burdened virtues.” These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own well being. It is suggested that eudaimonistic theories should be able to account for virtues of this sort.Less
Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, the book addresses the ways in which the devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities for flourishing. The book describes two different forms of “moral trouble” prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them, and that are referred to as “burdened virtues.” These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own well being. It is suggested that eudaimonistic theories should be able to account for virtues of this sort.
Vrinda Dalmiya
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199464760
- eISBN:
- 9780199086948
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199464760.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
As a venture in the emerging field of comparative feminist philosophy, this work goes against the current trend of considering ‘caring’ and ‘knowing’ as independent of each other. It argues for what ...
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As a venture in the emerging field of comparative feminist philosophy, this work goes against the current trend of considering ‘caring’ and ‘knowing’ as independent of each other. It argues for what can be called a care-based epistemology modelled on the now-familiar care ethics. Using critical insights from the Mahabharata, the book proposes that knowing and caring can be fruitfully theorized ‘together’, while keeping the argument firmly rooted in mainstream Anglo-Western virtue epistemology. What emerges is a feminist epistemology that uses the methods of creative comparative philosophy to come up with a concept of ‘relational humility’ as the fulcrum of a new theory of knowing. On the one hand, the epistemic and ethical paradigms given in the Mahābhārata are interrogated though the political lens of contemporary feminist theory. On the other, the scope of traditional care ethics and virtue epistemology is broadened through a dialogue with an epic’s narrative meditations on living well and knowing well in a very different context. Such a cross-cultural exploration gives us a robust conception of a ‘good knower’ who is both an ethical agent as well as ready to make interventions in various forms of epistemic injustices.Less
As a venture in the emerging field of comparative feminist philosophy, this work goes against the current trend of considering ‘caring’ and ‘knowing’ as independent of each other. It argues for what can be called a care-based epistemology modelled on the now-familiar care ethics. Using critical insights from the Mahabharata, the book proposes that knowing and caring can be fruitfully theorized ‘together’, while keeping the argument firmly rooted in mainstream Anglo-Western virtue epistemology. What emerges is a feminist epistemology that uses the methods of creative comparative philosophy to come up with a concept of ‘relational humility’ as the fulcrum of a new theory of knowing. On the one hand, the epistemic and ethical paradigms given in the Mahābhārata are interrogated though the political lens of contemporary feminist theory. On the other, the scope of traditional care ethics and virtue epistemology is broadened through a dialogue with an epic’s narrative meditations on living well and knowing well in a very different context. Such a cross-cultural exploration gives us a robust conception of a ‘good knower’ who is both an ethical agent as well as ready to make interventions in various forms of epistemic injustices.
Ami Harbin
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190277390
- eISBN:
- 9780190277420
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190277390.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book argues for the moral and political promise of disorientations, challenging common philosophical understandings of the necessity of orientedness for responsible moral action. In the face of ...
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This book argues for the moral and political promise of disorientations, challenging common philosophical understandings of the necessity of orientedness for responsible moral action. In the face of difficult life experiences like trauma, grief, illness, migration, education, queer identification, and consciousness-raising, individuals can be deeply disoriented, struggling to know how to go on. These and other disorientations are not rare. The book draws on first-person accounts, philosophical texts, and qualitative and quantitative research to show that in some cases of disorientation, individuals gain new forms of awareness of political complexity and social norms, and new habits of relating to others and an unpredictable moral landscape. It then argues for the moral and political promise of these gains. In philosophy, disorientations have been treated for the most part obliquely, as experiences avoidable and best avoided. It is not immediately clear how an experience that accentuates vulnerability and compromises capacities for decision-making and decisive action could improve moral and political agency. This book defends the view that experiences like disorientations can be morally productive, even when they fail to generate, or directly compromise, capacities for decisive moral judgment. It contributes to a tradition of feminist ethics and moral psychology that highlights the moral significance of everyday practices of embodiment, emotion, and relationality.Less
This book argues for the moral and political promise of disorientations, challenging common philosophical understandings of the necessity of orientedness for responsible moral action. In the face of difficult life experiences like trauma, grief, illness, migration, education, queer identification, and consciousness-raising, individuals can be deeply disoriented, struggling to know how to go on. These and other disorientations are not rare. The book draws on first-person accounts, philosophical texts, and qualitative and quantitative research to show that in some cases of disorientation, individuals gain new forms of awareness of political complexity and social norms, and new habits of relating to others and an unpredictable moral landscape. It then argues for the moral and political promise of these gains. In philosophy, disorientations have been treated for the most part obliquely, as experiences avoidable and best avoided. It is not immediately clear how an experience that accentuates vulnerability and compromises capacities for decision-making and decisive action could improve moral and political agency. This book defends the view that experiences like disorientations can be morally productive, even when they fail to generate, or directly compromise, capacities for decisive moral judgment. It contributes to a tradition of feminist ethics and moral psychology that highlights the moral significance of everyday practices of embodiment, emotion, and relationality.
Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing
Clausewitz's Puzzle
International Legitimacy and World Society
Multicultural Nationalism
Levelling the Playing Field
The Politics of Public Service Bargains
Corporate Governance, Competition, and Political Parties
The European Union and the People
Citizenship and the Environment
